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662 Current Anthropology Volume 58, Number 5, October 2017pared to the (low-ﬁdelity?) constructed-learning niches of non-
human primates (Fragaszy et al. 2013).Whether such structured
environments and social tolerance constitute “teaching” de-
pends on the deﬁnition employed (Kline 2015) and contributes
to the ambiguity of taxonomic distinctions between high- and
low-ﬁdelity transmission. Both Whiten (2015) and Stout (2013)
stress the importance of individual learning (practice), and Bril
and colleagues (Parry, Dietrich, and Bril 2014; Rein, Nonaka,
and Bril 2014) have shown that even modern human knap-
pers do not “imitate” in the strictest sense of copying partic-
ular movements. In fact, “imitation” (loosely deﬁned as copying
the means rather than the ends of an observed action) is another
slippery concept (Stout 2011) that depends on the level of analy-
sis (e.g., is a particular ﬂake removal a means or an end?) and
lends further ambiguity to the category “high ﬁdelity.” Finally,
a number of recent publications have speciﬁcally attempted to
diagnose the presence or absence of mechanisms like imitation
and teaching from archaeological evidence (Högberg, Gärden-
fors, and Larsson 2015; Shipton and Nielsen 2015; Stout et al.
2010). None of this work is decisive, but it clearly goes beyond
unquestioned assumptions about social transmission. What is
needed is more research effort, not a “reset” of assumptions.
Tennie et al.’s argument for individual/low-ﬁdelity learning
as a null hypothesis is motivated by the contention that high-
ﬁdelity transmission is absent from modern ape “cultures” and
presumably from the chimpanzee-human common ancestor.
This is a controversial position. Captive chimpanzees are known
to imitate speciﬁc actions (Horner and Whiten 2005; Whiten
et al. 2004) and to display conservatism (Price et al. 2009) and
conformity bias (Whiten, Horner, and de Waal 2005) in so-
cially learned tool use, leading to the establishment of stable
traditions. Tragic “natural experiments” involving snare in-
juries to wild gorillas and chimpanzees (Hobaiter and Byrne
2010) demonstrate imitation of motor procedures despite dif-
ferences in bodily capacities, and different groups of lowland
gorillas maintain distinct technical traditions for eating nettle
leaves, distinguished by speciﬁc actions such as folding the
leaf bundle (Byrne, Hobaiter, and Klailova 2011). One of these
traditions persists despite being less efﬁcient than the alter-
native, and it is not a likely convergence point for individual
learning. Given these known capacities of other apes, it is dif-
ﬁcult to see why an absence of imitation should be the null
hypothesis for the Early Stone Age. Such a null unduly priv-
ileges transmission mechanisms as the explanation for differ-
ences in cultural accumulation, distracting from other factors
such as individual cognitive limitations (Stout 2011; Whiten,
Horner, and Marshall-Pescini 2003), levels of sociability (Prad-
han, Tennie, and van Schaik 2012), the internal dynamics of
cultural evolution (Enquist, Ghirlanda, and Eriksson 2011; Stout
2011), or gene-culture coevolution (Morgan 2016).
More generally, I would suggest that a formal null/alternative
hypothesis testing framework is the wrong heuristic for our
current state of understanding. As Tennie et al. point out, we
are not yet able to directly diagnose transmission mechanisms
from archaeological evidence. As ethologists have discoveredThis content downloaded from 128.041
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms a(Byrne 2007; Laland and Janik 2006), this leaves us with a
problematic process-of-elimination approach to culture as that
which is left over when all other possible explanations have
been eliminated. It is logically impossible to falsify a null in
this way, and the approach can be expected to reject most ac-
tual cases of culture. The island test illustrates this, because
many things that are indeed learned by high-ﬁdelity trans-
mission would not be impossible for an individual to reinvent.
Importantly, the archaeological record typically provides ev-
idence of common, rather than rare or unique, behaviors. A
less rigid, parsimony-based approach would recognize archae-
ological behaviors as cultural if the likely frequency of indi-
vidual reinvention is insufﬁcient to explain the behavior’s ob-
served prevalence (Byrne 2007; Stout et al. 2010). The most
appropriate focus for such investigation is on speciﬁc knap-
ping methods (i.e., imitated means), such as platform prepa-
ration (Stout et al. 2014) or debitage organization (Stout et al.
2010), rather than on the presence, absence, or morphology of
archaeologically deﬁned tool types (i.e., emulated goals). Com-
parative evidence indicates that the presence of high-ﬁdelity
transmission in the Early Stone Age is not an exceptional claim;
exceptional evidence should not be required.Ignacio de la Torre
Institute of Archaeology, University College London, 31–34 Gordon
Square, London WC1 H0PY, United Kingdom (i.torre@ucl.ac.uk).
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In the last few years, some interesting works are transcend-
ing the usual typological/technological study of Early Stone Age
assemblages and attempting to provide insights into early hu-
man cognition and culture from a number of perspectives that
are not strictly archaeological (e.g., Morgan et al. 2015; Stout
and Chaminade 2012; Whiten 2011; Wynn et al. 2011). Al-
though I am unsure about how much new material or how
many new ideas are in this paper that are not in another one
recently published by the same authors (Tennie et al. 2016),
I ﬁnd their premises interesting and challenging. Thus, I agree
that those of us interested in early human behavior should
be more careful in taking for granted that cumulative cultural
learning is responsible for all of what we see in the archaeo-
logical record.
The latent-solutions and island hypotheses are appealing as
far as earliest Mode 1 technologies (Lomekwian and African
early Oldowan) are concerned, particularly with regard to the
very ﬁrst records; given that, for now, no archaeological sites
have been documented in the time interval between the Lome-
kwian at 3.3 million years ago (Harmand et al. 2015) and the
earliest Oldowan at 2.6 million years ago (Semaw et al. 2003), it
is tempting to picture a scenario where stone tool ﬂaking was
(re)discovered once and again by, perhaps, several hominin
species. To some extent, the Oldowan record earlier than 2
million years ago, for which we have only a handful of sites,.035.146 on October 27, 2017 04:35:39 AM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Tennie et al. Early Stone Tools and Cultural Transmission 663could be interpreted in a similar manner, although it is still
unclear whether the discontinuity of the early Oldowan rec-
ord represents real gaps (and thus latent-solutions mecha-
nisms could be set in motion) or whether it is just an artefact
of entropy and the nature of the sedimentary record. For the
Oldowan that is less than 2 million years ago, however, I ﬁnd
it more difﬁcult to challenge, as the authors do, that “artifacts
in the earliest archaeological record are products of culturally
transmitted information.” How would we otherwise explain
the continuity of the record in those regions where hominins
shared particular behavioral patterns over hundreds of thou-
sands of years? The authors might reply that hive making is also
patterned but is genetically rather than culturally controlled.
But culture is not just an equivalent of hive making (or stone
tool making, for that matter) and comprehends many other
dimensions; Oldowan assemblages are characterized not only
by (relatively simple) cores and ﬂakes but also by speciﬁc raw
material acquisition patterns, home range, and subsistence
(normally through scavenging) strategies; such strategies are
regionally variable but, on the other hand, are often quite con-
sistent within each region through time. This all suggests to
me that there must have been socially transmitted informa-
tion that was passed through thousands of generations. I am
unsure whether that should be called high-ﬁdelity cultural
transmission, but I am also hesitant to admit there is a latent
solution for each and every decision regarding what rocks to
transport and for how long, how to ﬂake them, and how to use
them on speciﬁc plant and animal resources acquired through
speciﬁc subsistence strategies.
While the Oldowan record may lack the level of resolution
required to explore what is genetically coded and what re-
quires socially transmitted information, modern primates pro-
vide an excellent framework to discuss aspects arising from
this paper. As an archaeologist, I shall leave to the specialists
the relevance of latent solutions among modern primates. Still,
I would like to learn more about how the authors explain
(beyond the presence of stimulus enhancement) the existence
of distinctive cultural traits that have proved to be transmitted
through generations among regionally speciﬁc great ape groups
(e.g., Whiten et al. 1999).
While I ﬁnd a latent-solutions option compelling to con-
sider (at least in part) for the earliest archaeological sites (some
of the simplest Mode 1 lithics might be little more than con-
choidally fractured rocks, and eventually we may even ﬁnd out
that production of conchoidal ﬂakes through intentional stone
breaking is not exclusive of our direct evolutionary lineage),
we should avoid generalizations; hinting, as the authors do,
that other Early Stone Age technologies, such as the Acheu-
lean or even the Middle Palaeolithic/Middle Stone Age lithic
technology, could be explained by latent solutions is, in my
opinion, overstretching the argument. There is no space here
to elaborate on the conceptual and motor skills involved in
handaxe making or to delve into the (apparently endless) dis-
cussion on the meaning of biface morphology variability. Still,
the exquisite expertise that is required for a (modern) knapperThis content downloaded from 128.041
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms ato make a Kombewa cleaver, a Levallois preferential ﬂake, or
a Tabelbala-Tachenghit handaxe is well known to archaeolo-
gists. For many years, I have attempted to raise my latent
solutions and make a handaxe like the one in ﬁgure 2, with
no luck so far, and I fear that, no matter how many times
the authors left me on their island, I would never be able to
make it.Thomas Wynn
University of Colorado Center for Cognitive Archaeology, 1420
Austin Bluffs Parkway, Colorado Springs, Colorado 80918, USA
(twynn@uccs.edu). 25 VI 16
I strongly support Tennie et al.’s call for a null hypothesis to
guide research into early lithic technology but suggest that the
null could be more broadly stated. Instead of focusing nar-
rowly on social learning, the hypothesis should instead be
formulated in more general cognitive or behavioral terms, such
as “early lithic technology was well within the cognitive ca-
pacities of apes.” Paleoanthropologists would then need toFigure 2. Tabelbala-Tachenghit technique cleaver from Tacheng-
hit (photograph by I. de la Torre, Collection Cesar 1915, Institut
de Paléontologie Humaine, Paris). A color version of this ﬁgure is
available online..035.146 on October 27, 2017 04:35:39 AM
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